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Financing Mental
Health Services
for the Homeless
Mentally III in
New England
Margaret Stephens
Dominic Hodgkin
This paper examines how New England states payfor the mental health care of the
homeless mentally ill. The focus is on how states choose providers, how they reimburse
and monitor them, and how these arrangements may affect the incentives facing
providers. Detailed case studies ofMassachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont regula-
tions are included. The studies reveal important differences in how states choose and
reimburse providers, for both the homeless and nonhomeless mentally ill. The states
also differ in the extent to which they have contracted with nontraditional providers,
which many believe to be a necessary approach, given the frequent unwillingness of
homeless persons to use the traditional mental health care system. The authors recom-
mend investigation of the health, housing, and cost outcomes associated with these
interstate differences in reimbursement policy, as the relationship may offer insights
relevant to ongoing policy reforms.
During the 1980s, New England's strong regional economy allowed the states
to develop new services targeted at the homeless mentally ill, whose numbers
were surging partly as a result of deinstitutionalization policies. The regional fiscal
climate in the 1990s is less favorable, due to the recession and voter hostility to
taxes, as a result of which states are scrambling to improve the cost-effectiveness of
their spending on human services. As a result, there is increasing interest in the effect
of contract and reimbursement design on the delivery of human services. In this
respect, the New England states provide a potentially instructive set of comparisons,
given their historically widely divergent patterns of contracting and reimbursement
procedures for human services. 1
Our aim is to examine in detail how mental health services for the homeless
mentally ill are paid for in three New England states, and note where differences
have implications for policy discussions. We explain why we think that the design of
provider reimbursement is relevant to the delivery of human services, including care
of the homeless mentally ill, note constraints common to all New England states, and
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present detailed case studies of provider reimbursement in Vermont, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island. Finally, we discuss our results and draw a few conclusions.
Issues in Provider Reimbursement
In analyzing the financing of mental health care and other human services, it is useful
to distinguish the purchaser-provider relationship from the relationships among vari-
ous purchasers (for example, federal government, state government, local mental
health boards). Some previous research has addressed the issues involved in design of
intergovernmental transfers in mental health, 2 and the sources of state mental health
financing in New England. 3 In contrast, we focus on purchaser-provider relationships
building on earlier work on state contracting in mental health. 4
A key question in evaluating human service contracts concerns the way the unit
of service is defined and performance is evaluated. These questions arise because
human service contracts typically pay providers according to their use of inputs
rather than outputs, owing to the equity and incentive problems that could result if
providers were paid solely by results. For an example of the incentive problems, con-
sider the effect of a state policy guaranteeing to pay providers only for those home-
less mentally ill persons successfully housed and placed in treatment. Rather than
maximizing total outreach, this payment system would offer clear incentives for a
provider to seek out those homeless people most likely to respond to outreach and
ignore others, despite their possibly greater need. Although inpriniciple the state
could prevent such an outcome by adjusting provider payments for case severity,
in practice the informational and administrative requirements for doing so would
be prohibitive for many human services, including, presumably, treatment of the
homeless mentally ill.
The alternative usually found in human services is to contract for inputs,that is,
to pay providers based on hours of care provided or numbers treated or according to
a set budget. Where funding is affected by the success or failure of the program, the
effect occurs only with a lag, for example, through eventual nonrenewal of contracts
if performance is deemed unsatisfactory. In turn, this choice of payment system
means that one must pay extra attention to the incentive effects of how inputs are
reimbursed and how performance is measured.
A second set of issues concerns the process by which the contract is awarded.
Design issues include how the state decides who is qualified to bid, whether it makes
regular use of requests for proposals (RFP), and how it selects the winning bid.
Again, the risk of unobservable quality variation is one reason why states may not
always choose the lowest bidder for a contract. Other reasons include the desire to
keep a wide pool of potential bidders for future contracts, concern for continuity
of care, or lobbying on behalf of particular bidders by legislators, human service
professionals, and consumers.
A possible objection to the above approach would be that human service pro-
viders differ from, say, manufacturing subcontractors in that they are altruistically
motivated. By implication, they would not respond to apparent incentives in a profit-
maximizing way, if this would harm patient care. This argument has some validity,
but there is also evidence of providers avoiding hard to treat or disruptive mental
patients in the absence of special subsidies for treating them.5 The best research
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strategy is probably to treat this as an empirical question, with provider altruism
(no effect of incentives) being one possible hypothesis to test against others.
Although our focus is on homeless-specific reimbursement issues,the case studies
also provide some background on mental health reimbursement in general. One
reason this is important is that the homeless mentally ill are likely to be affected by
the design of mental health contracts in general, not only those targeted to the
homeless. For example, poorly designed performance incentives in general contracts
may lead mental health providers to avoid the homeless mentally ill.
The Overall Environment
It is worth noting a few issues common to all states. First, all program planners face
problems in determining the size of the population for whom they are developing
programs. Estimates of homelessness in the United States range from 250,000 to
300,000 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development) to 735,000
(National Alliance to End Homelessness). To further compound the problem, sur-
veys report that anywhere from 10 to 47 percent of the homeless are mentally ill. 6
The difficulty arises partly from the lack of a standard definition of homelessness
(currently or at risk of; chronic or episodic) and partly from a lack of staff at shelters
who are trained to diagnose mental illness. Surveys may report number of homeless
individuals on any given night, over the course of a year, or served in shelters. All
our estimates are subject to this imprecision. While they are the best guesstimates
of knowledgeable state officials, these numbers should in no way be considered as
definitive counts.
Another common theme is the difficulty of persuading the homeless mentally ill
to accept treatment from traditional providers such as a community mental health
center (CMHC). For the homeless mentally ill population, CMHCs may appear
unattractive because there is a certain amount of pressure to follow a full treatment
plan. For example, if medication is prescribed for an individual but not taken, there
may be pressure in counseling or other treatment sessions to take the medication.
Day treatment programs may combine homeless individuals with others with whom
they feel they have little in common.
This has obliged states to make use of alternative providers such as shelters or
food banks, which often operate outside the formal mental health system. In turn,
the states' use of such providers poses a separate problem of how far to integrate
their reimbursement and contracting arrangements with those used for traditional
mental health providers.
Another constraint shared by all states is the existing organization of federal
financing for care of the mentally ill homeless. Because of the federal system's criti-
cal importance for the states' own efforts, we describe it in detail.
The federal government currently awards funds to states for the provision of ser-
vices to persons with severe mental illness who are homeless or at risk of homeless-
ness through the Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH)
formula grant program. This program is a replacement for and an expansion of the
McKinney Mental Health Services for the Homeless block grant program (MHSH)
and is administered by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). Under this
program, Congress is authorized to appropriate $75 million through 1994; the fund-
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ing level for fiscal year 1991 was $33.1 million and $30 million has been appropri-
ated for 1992. A state submits an annual application to NIMH and designates a state
agency to administer the program. For every $3.00 it receives in federal funds, a state
must make a $1.00 contribution in cash or in kind. Table 1 provides a comparison of
the PATH and MHSH programs.
Table 1
Comparison of PATH and MHSH Federal Programs
PATH MHSH
Appropriation $33 million (FY 1991)
Target Population Individuals with serious mental illness
and those with serious mental illness
and substance-abuse disorders who are
homeless or at imminent risk of becoming
homeless
$28 million (FY 1990)
Individuals who are chronically mentally
ill and homeless
Forms of
Assistance
Formula grants to states, District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
territories
Block grants to same
Eligible Entities States, which must make payments to
political subdivisions of the state, and
nonprofit private entities, including
community-based veterans organizations
and other community organizations
Matching Funds For every $3.00 of federal funds provided,
a $1.00 match in public or private non-
federal funds; match may be in cash
or in kind
States, which must use funds to
provide community mental health
services to homeless individuals
Same
Required Services
Housing
Assistance
Restriction on
Funds
Same as MHSH, plus screening and
diagnostic treatment services; habilitation
and rehabilitation services; alcohol or drug
treatment services; housing services; other
appropriate services
Up to 20 percent of payment may be used
for housing services, including minor
renovation, expansion, and repair; planning
for housing; technical assistance in applying
for housing assistance; coordination of
housing and services; security deposits;
cost of matching individuals with appropriate
housing situations; one-time rental
payments to prevent eviction.
No more than 20 percent for housing
services; no more than 4 percent of total
allocation for administrative expenses.
Payments may not be expended for
emergency shelters, housing construction,
inpatient psychiatric or substance-abuse
treatment, or cash payments to recipients
of mental health services.
Outreach; community mental health
services; referrals; staff training; case
management; supportive services in
residential settings
None
State agency may not spend more than
4 percent for administrative expenses.
Payments may not be made for inpatient
services, cash payments to clients,
purchase or improvement of property,
purchase of medical equipment, or to
satisfy required nonfederal match.
Allotment of Minimum allotment: $300,000 for states,
Funds District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico;
$50,000 for U.S. territories. Allotment
determination formula: based on percentage
of population living in urbanized areas of the
state versus percentage of population living
in urbanized areas of United States.
Minimum allotment: $275,000 for states.
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico;
$50,000 for U.S. territories. Allotment
determination formula: same as PATH.
Source: Access 3, no. 1 (Janury 1991): 5.
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Two major differences are worth noting. First, individuals with a dual diagnosis of
mental illness and substance abuse may not be excluded by any agency that receives
PATH funds. Second, additional services, including housing services, are authorized
under PATH. Housing services may include planning and coordinating housing ser-
vices; providing technical support to those applying for housing assistance; matching
people with appropriate residential programs; minor renovation, expansion, or
repair of residences; and one-time rental payments to prevent eviction. 7
State Studies
The case studies of three New England states were chosen partly for their contrast-
ing approaches to reimbursement and contracting. Where appropriate, similarities/
differences with other New England states will be noted. Table 2 contains informa-
tion on the three states we discuss in detail: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Ver-
mont. For comparison, Table 3 provides the same information for the remaining
New England states.
The information on states' contracting practices was collected primarily through
conversations with officials in the government agency responsible for overseeing the
mental health service system in each state and through examination of sample docu-
ments supplied by the officials. Our analysis has not been reviewed by anyone within
these agencies. We take full responsibility for any errors or omissions in this article.
Table 2
State Comparisons
Massachusetts Rhode Island Vermont
Population (1990) 6,016,000 1,003,000 563,000
Area (square miles) 10,555 1,545 9,615
Percent of Population
in Metropolitan Areas 90.4% 92.5% 23.4%
State Mental
Health Agency
Department of Mental
Health
Division of Mental Health
and Community
Support Services
Division of Mental Health
Community Mental
Health Service System
State-operated CMHCs;
contracts wiith private
providers
Contracts with private
providers; CMHC
responsible for specific
area
Contracts with designated
private providers; CMHC
responsible for specific
area
PATH funding $862,751 (FY 91)
$706,000 (FY 92)
$300,000 (FY 91)
$300,000 (FY 92)
$300,000 (FY 91)
$300,000 (FY 92)
Services to Homeless
Mentally III
Shelters: 2 DMH, 1
contracted; DMH-operated
outreach team; contracts
for psychiatric nurses at
shelters and for detox
center
4 CMHCs offer outreach,
mobile treatment;
non-CMCH operates
drop-in center
Contracts fund staff
positions at generic,
antipoverty organizations
Funding Process
(private providers)
Five-year RFP cycle Annual budget -
negotiations with
existingcontractors; RFP
for new services
Annual budget negotia-
tions with designated
providers; annual
funding application for
providers of homeless
mentally ill services
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991; state mental health plans as referenced in text; state
mental health agency officials.
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Table 3
State Comparisons
Connecticut Maine New Hampshire
Population (1990) 3,287,000 1,228,000 1,109,000
Area (square miles) 5,544 35,387 9,351
Percentage of
Population in
Metropolitan Areas 92.4% 35.9% 56.1%
State Mental
Health Agency
Department of Mental
Health
Bureau of Mental Health Bureau of Mental Health
Services
Community Mental
Health Service
System
State-operated CMHCs;
contracts with private
providers
Contracts with private
providers
Contracts with approved
private providers; CMHC
responsible for specific
area
PATH funding $449,325 (FY 91)
$366,000 (FY 92)
$300,000 (FY 91)
$300,000 (FY 92)
$300,000 (FY 91)
$300,000 (FY 92)
Services to Homeless
Mentally III
State CMHCs offer
outreach and case
management; contracts
for case management and
outreach to shelters
Contracts for outreach
and supportive services
at shelters; intensive case
management in most
areas
CMHCs provide outreach,
case management,
shelters; local groups
operate housing and loan
programs
Funding Process
(private providers)
Annual budget nego-
tiations with existing
contractors; RFP for
Current— annual budget
negotiations with existing
contractors; RFP for new
Annual budget nego-
tiations with existing
contractors; RFP for
new services services; 1996 — six-year
RFP cycle
new services
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991; state mental health plans as referenced in text; state
mental health agency officials.
Massachusetts
The commonwealth of Massachusetts covers an area of approximately 10,500 square
miles and has about 6 million inhabitants (1990 estimate). The Department of
Mental Health (DMH), a subdivision of the Executive Office of Human Services,
oversees the provision of mental health services to children and adults in the com-
monwealth. In 1990, the administrative structure ofDMH was reorganized; separate
area, regional, and inpatient administrative offices were consolidated into nine ser-
vice delivery areas. 8
The DMH had a fiscal 1991 budget of over $450 million, of which 50.53 percent
was allocated to purchased and contracted services, with the remainder funding
services operated by the state. Private contractors provide virtually all residential
services and more than three quarters of emergency services and skill development/
employment services. Case management and adult inpatient services are almost
completely provided by the state. As of April 1991, DMH had approximately 1,400
contracts totaling $199 million. Of these, approximately 1,000 contracts were for
mental health services, with the remainder covering such varied services as laundry
and medical laboratory services. 9
At the beginning of 1991, the regular DMH service delivery system included six-
teen DMH-operated facilities: seven state hospitals for adults, one facility for chil-
dren, and eight community mental health centers. In June 1991, the Governor's
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Special Commission on Facility Consolidation submitted a report recommending the
closure of three of the hospitals and the restructuring of acute inpatient services.
The commission plans to submit its recommendations on the community mental
health centers and the children's facility later in 1992. 10
DMH has begun to act upon these recommendations: closure of one of the
hospitals has been completed, and DMH is currently evaluating the responses to
a request for proposals for the development of acute care inpatient units in com-
munity and private hospitals. Some patient advocates and providers have charged
that the numbers of homeless mentally ill are increasing sharply as a result of the
facility closures and the recent elimination of General Relief welfare benefits for
the mentally ill. 11
It is estimated that there are between 2,500 and 3,000 homeless mentally ill
individuals in Massachusetts, with 1,500 to 2,000 in the Metropolitan Boston area
alone. 12 DMH has focused on improving the collaboration between shelters and the
existing mental health system in order to reach the homeless mentally ill population
and improve their access to the service system. Each DMH area is required to have
an agreement with every shelter within its boundaries which describes the provision
of clinical, case management, crisis, and educational services to the shelter. In addi-
tion, it is DMH policy that homeless individuals be given priority for case manage-
ment services. 13
In the Boston area, the Department of Mental Health operates two shelters for
homeless mentally ill individuals and contracts for a third. The aim of these shelters
is to stabilize clients rather than provide temporary shelter; staff are clinically
trained. DMH also operates a homeless outreach team in the Boston area whose
function is to visit area shelters and provide case management services for mentally
ill residents. This team also performs street outreach.
DMH contracts with five non-DMH shelters in the Boston area for the provision
of a total of 10.2 full-time equivalent (FTE) psychiatric nurses who function as stabi-
lizing forces at the shelter sites. The nurses refer clients to the homeless outreach
team and confer with them on case management decisions. They are responsible for
general health care issues as well and network with other shelters and providers; due
to the numerous providers of different services to the homeless, networking is neces-
sary to maintain the flow of information to all caregivers involved with an individual.
Nurses often have input into policy and program development decisions as well.
DMH and the Department of Public Health jointly fund a contract with an orga-
nization that operates an intensive care detoxification center for substance-abusing
homeless mentally ill individuals.
Federal MHSH funds have been used to support 19.5 FTE shelter specialists in
shelters throughout the state. In addition to providing direct care, shelter specialists
refer clients to entitlement, training, and education programs and to community
mental health centers or substance-abuse treatment providers. For the current year,
DMH hopes to use 2.5 FTE to fund housing services advocates who would act as
consultants to the shelter specialists, provide technical assistance to clients referred
by them, and seek out available existing housing. 14
DMH has made development of housing a priority, which is evidenced by the fact
that within the last five years, in the Boston area alone, 400 units of housing (500 if
independent-living apartments are included) have been developed and there are
agreements for the development of over 400 more units within the next eighteen
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months. Also in Boston, 215 residential beds have been set aside for the homeless
mentally ill with half the individuals coming from DMH shelters and half from
inpatient facilities. DMH has contracted with a variety of private nonprofit organiza-
tions to provide these beds and gives the local community mental health center the
responsibility for programmatic oversight. The problem DMH faces is being able to
provide the funding for the necessary supportive services.
This problem was reported in Maine as well. In 1989, Maine voters approved a $7
million housing bond referendum, which has since been leveraged into a $12 million
mental health facility fund being used for acquiring and rehabilitating residential
program sites. A request for proposals was sent out in 1991 for the development
of residential projects in nine areas of the state, which will result in at least 54 addi-
tional places for mentally ill adults. However, funds for operating costs and support-
ive services are not adequate to allow financing of all the proposals the Bureau of
Mental Health would have liked. 15
The Code of Massachusetts Regulations, Chapter 808.200, details the procedures
state agencies must follow when purchasing social services. Contracts for all services
performed by private providers must be opened to rebidding at least once every five
years. A request for proposals is developed which describes the services sought and
the evaluation criteria and must include price information— the schedule of prices
or price methodology. 16
The Massachusetts five-year RFP cycle is unique within the New England area.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the RFP process is used in Rhode Island
to develop new programs; however, once chosen, the contractor becomes a sole
source provider. In Connecticut, a similar process requests grant applications for the
development of new programs. After the initial year of operation, however, the pro-
gram is funded through a separate process. Funding is requested through plans sub-
mitted by area directors to the Connecticut Department of Mental Health, which
separates programs into two categories: continuation and expansion or new pro-
grams. The legislature specifies funding levels for each category. Thus, again, the
contractor becomes a sole source provider. In further contrast, the Connecticut
Department of Mental Health is under no obligation to put out contracts for com-
petitive bidding for new or expansion programs as is the Massachusetts DMH.
The Massachusetts request for proposals process begins with publication of a
notice in the Goods and Services Bulletin. The notice includes a brief program
description, deadline information, and a contact within the contracting state agency.
The department seeking to purchase services is required to "disseminate notices of
availability of the RFP in a manner designed to obtain the widest possible competi-
tion at least 20 calendar days prior to the deadline for submission of proposals." 17 A
bidders' conference is held at which bidders may ask questions about any aspect of
the RFP or the RFP process. Prior to submission of a proposal, all bidders must be
qualified by their principal purchasing agency, that is, the agency within the Execu-
tive Office of Human Services which has awarded the greatest total contract dollars
to the provider in the most recent fiscal year. Qualification requires the submission
of financial and organizational data that demonstrates a bidder's ability to meet
minimum administrative and fiscal standards.
In general, proposals must include a description of the program, a proposed
budget, an agency and/or program organizational chart, job descriptions for all pro-
gram staff positions, proof of license, if required, and certification from the State
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Office of Minority and Women Business Assistance (SOMWBA), if applicable. 18
Further qualifications and/or requirements may be specified in the RFP itself.
Contents of the proposal may become part of the final contract.
Proposals are required to be evaluated according to the priorities and program-
matic guidelines specified in the RFP. Proposals are initially screened to ensure that
they meet the minimum requirements and conditions contained in the RFP. A selec-
tions committee, whose members must include at least three state employees, is
formed to review these proposals and make a recommendation to either the area
director or the central office, whichever level is purchasing the services, who may
then accept or reject the recommendation. An RFP may be withdrawn at any time
during this process and a new RFP issued. 19
The department may also initiate competitive negotiations with all qualified bid-
ders, during which the original specifications in the RFP may be modified as long as
it is reasonably believed that organizations which did not bid on the original RFP
would not have bid had the modifications been included. 20
Contract negotiations are limited to terms and conditions that were not specifi-
cally addressed in the RFP or the proposal. If the division cannot reach agreement
with the first prioritized bidder after a reasonable time, it may disqualify that bid-
der and begin contract negotiations with the next prioritized bidder. 21 Unsuccessful
bidders may request a meeting with the department to discuss the reasons a com-
petitor's proposal was selected and may appeal the decision to the head of the
department, and if still dissatisfied, may appeal the department head's decision to
the assistant commissioner of the Division of Purchased Services.22
There are two additional methods of procuring services: prequalified services
procurement and noncompetitive procurement. If a department is unsure of the
amount of services that will be required over the course of the year or cannot deter-
mine when services will be required, it may instead award a contract through a pre-
qualified services procurement process. The department defines in its request for
qualifications the time frame in which services may be required and a plan selecting
qualified bidders during this period. 23 Noncompetitive procurement is permitted if
(1) there is an emergency, (2) the department determines, after a thorough investi-
gation, that only one provider is qualified to perform the services, (3) a change in a
contractor's administration, staffing, or facility has made it unable to perform the
services, (4) a secondary purchaser wishes to purchase a portion of a program, or (5)
the funding appropriation for the services specifically identifies a provider or type of
provider. The department must keep on record a written justification for all non-
competitive contracts and must file a list of all such contracts with the Division of
Purchased Services quarterly.24
The terms of the contracts themselves are governed by the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations 808.100: Prices, Reporting, and Auditing for Social Service Programs. A
department may use two types of contracts: cost-reimbursement and fee-for-service.
A cost-reimbursement contract includes a detailed budget specifying the total antici-
pated expenditure per line item, offsets per line item such as third-party payments
or payments from other state departments, and the maximum amount DMH agrees
to reimburse during the contract period. The contractor is reimbursed for costs doc-
umented and submitted to DMH each month and has a full year to reach the maxi-
mum. Cost reimbursement contracts may be used only if it is a start-up year, the
program is available for purchase only by the department and utilization cannot be
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predicted, or payment on a fee-for-service basis would be detrimental to the quality
or effectiveness of the program.25
Fee-for-service contracts include those purchased for negotiated prices, compo-
nent pricing, or unit rate. There are two types of unit rate contracts: class rate and
individual rate. Class rates, established by the state's Rate Setting Commission, are
not discretionary. Historical expenditures of the providers of a specific type of ser-
vice are examined and a form of weighted average is computed to set the rate per
unit of service. These rates are reexamined every few years and after extended nego-
tiations between the commission and the providers and a public hearing, new rates
are set. DMH contracts for most outpatient services, psychiatric day treatment, and
certain types of hospitalization in this manner. Individual rates occur if the service is
different and meets a specific DMH need. The provider documents its projected
costs and a special rate is negotiated. In general, residential programs fall into this
rate category. In all cases, the Division of Purchased Services must approve the price
to be paid under a contract and notify the state comptroller of the authorized price.
Contracts are monitored by requiring providers to submit a Uniform Financial
Statement and Independent Auditor's Report to the Division of Purchased Services
before the fifteenth day of the fifth month after the contractor's fiscal year has
ended. 26 Providers are asked to submit the following audited basic financial state-
ments: balance sheet, statement of revenues and expenses and changes in fund bal-
ances, and statement of functional expenses. They must also submit the following
supplemental schedules: supplemental revenue, supplemental expense, supplemen-
tal employee, and supplemental program statistics.
Despite Massachusetts's elaborate array of regulations designed to encourage
competition, some studies have found a lack of takers for mental health contracts. In
a 1986 study, Schlesinger et al. found that almost two thirds of "competitively" bid
contracts only attracted one vendor, and only 15 percent attracted more than two.27
More recently, a Suffolk University study has argued that there is a lack of competi-
tion in the private sector with the implication that contracting out mental health ser-
vices could actually raise costs to the state.28 These results highlight the importance
of understanding market structure for any evaluation of proposed reforms to con-
tracting in mental health.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island covers approximately 1,500 square miles and has just over one mil-
lion inhabitants (1990 estimate). The Division of Mental Health and Community
Support Services (DMH), a subdivision of the Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals, oversees the provision of community mental health
services in Rhode Island. The planning emphasis is primarily on adults with a severe
mental illness, whom the division terms "community support clients." The Rhode
Island Department for Children and Their Families has the primary responsibility
for the provision of mental health services to children.
The Rhode Island mental health service system is divided into eight catchment
areas, each of which contains a single comprehensive community mental health
center. The CMHC is a nonprofit agency that provides all the outpatient public
mental health services in its area and is responsible for all admissions to and dis-
charges from the Institute of Mental Health, the state inpatient facility. The service
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system also includes three organizations that provide residential services to the
severely mentally ill. 29 Contracts with these major providers totaled over $24 million
in fiscal 1991. 30
DMH also contracts with numerous small organizations for specific services; for
example, in fiscal 1991, DMH funded a client literacy program, a refugee center, a
mental health worker certification program, and others. The only non-CMHC con-
tractor that provides services specifically aimed toward homeless mentally ill individ-
uals falls into this category. Contracts with these small organizations totaled nearly
$3 million in 1991. 31
It has been estimated that there are 4,400 homeless people in Rhode Island over
the course of a year. A census done in April 1991 counted 471 individuals in shelters
or visible on the streets; however, shelter operators report that the approximately
500 beds throughout the state are filled each night. DMH uses the following per-
centages to estimate the numbers of homeless mentally ill: 19 percent of all home-
less individuals have a serious mental illness and an additional 27 percent are in
need of mental health services.
In 1987, as part of the process of developing the state plan for mental health ser-
vices, surveys of homeless individuals were conducted in Providence and Newport.
The Providence survey was performed at eight sites (including shelters and the bus
terminal) in addition to some street interviews. A total of 144 homeless people were
interviewed. This survey found that 18.8 percent were judged to have severe and/or
persistent mental disability. 32
The survey in Newport interviewed seven individuals looking for temporary
shelter at a YMCA shelter. None of these were found to be "definitely severely
mentally disabled." The results of this survey are not considered as valid as those
of the Providence survey owing to the small sample size and lack of information on
previous treatment. 33
As a result of these surveys, the mental health plan recommended the creation of
aggressive outreach services focused on linking the homeless with mental illness with
the necessary services; the plan states that the community support services it pro-
poses were appropriate for these individuals and that the problem is more one of
identifying and gaining service acceptance by this population. The plan proposed
creation of the following programs: (1) an outreach and liaison program to operate
on the streets, (2) a mobile care team to operate at shelters, soup kitchens, and simi-
lar sites, (3) drop-in center(s) located near homeless shelters, and (4) transitional
residential beds.34
Rhode Island funds four CMHCs to provide services specifically aimed at the
homeless population. The services provided include homeless outreach teams and
mobile treatment teams. Of the roughly $300,000 allocated for services to the home-
less, approximately $200,000 is split among the four CMHCs. The remaining third
funds a contract with a non-CMHC provider, Travelers Aid, which operates a drop-
in center in Providence.
In an attempt to provide "light" services rather than the CMHCs' regular package
of services, DMH funds the drop-in center, which is designed to be external to the
CMHCs. Light services are social— having a cup of coffee together and talking.
Because they are not structured, they are valuable in reaching individuals who are
the most resistant to standard treatment, like many of the homeless population. The
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drop-in center staff includes a full-time CMHC person to facilitate referral into the
CMHC system, but referral is not the main focus of this service.
Contracts with community mental health centers result from sole source negotia-
tions; there is no competition for these contracts. CMHCs must complete a plan for
service development. This document defines DMH service priorities, standard pro-
gram element definitions, planning guidelines, and service need data for each catch-
ment area. CMHCs are required to prepare reports containing information on each
of the program elements, which include the population served, service objectives
and modalities, outcome assessment and quality assurance mechanisms, staff cost,
units of service, and active clients and anticipated admissions and discharges in the
previous year, current year, and as proposed for the coming year. 35 A separate
budget application is prepared, which contains detailed expenditure and income
data. Income data requested include income from federal grants, all state agencies,
and local sources. Expenditure data include personnel and operating expenditure
for each program as spent in the prior year, budgeted for the current year, and antic-
ipated in the coming year.36 The final contract amounts and service levels are negoti-
ated between the contractor and DMH.
The contract with Travelers Aid for the drop-in center in Providence did go
through a competitive process. Over two years ago, the division sent out an RFP for
the provision of services of a more social, less treatment-oriented nature. CMHCs
were not barred from competing for this contract even though the services requested
were intended to get away from those of the standard CMHC package. Five propos-
als were submitted, three from CMHCs and two from other organizations.
Once awarded the contract, Travelers Aid became the sole source provider of
these services and is annually re-funded in much the same manner as are the com-
munity mental health centers.
Each CMHC has one contract that covers the provision of all services. A non-
CMHC contract, such as Travelers Aid's, is similar but would, of course, cover only
the services specifically purchased from this provider. A general agreement con-
tains general provisions; for example, equal employment opportunity requirements,
termination and amendment terms, and language holding the state harmless from
liability for any act of the contractor. Program descriptions and requirements are
contained in addenda that cover broad categories of services such as community
support services or acute alternatives. All program-specific information is found in
these sections: the purpose of the service, the population to be served, and exact
definitions of each service including how units of service are to be measured. Sec-
tions of the plan for service development that contain performance standards and
targets which were agreed upon during contract negotiations are referenced and
incorporated into the contract. Quality assurance and reporting requirements are
included as well. Services to be provided to the homeless population, like mobile
treatment teams, are contained in such an addendum.
A separate addendum defines the financial terms and conditions of the contract
and includes a budget summary, payment terms, budget amendment procedures,
and financial reporting requirements. Terms specific to service types may include
required occupancy levels for residential services or penalties for overutilization of
the state hospital for the mentally ill.
Provider performance is monitored by requiring periodic reporting of service and
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financial data. Program reports must be submitted monthly. Required financial
reports include the following: quarterly report of income and expenses, six-month
income and expenditure detail, projection of year-end income and expenditure
report, final expenditure report, and a year-end audit.
Vermont
The state of Vermont covers an area of approximately 9,600 square miles and has an
estimated population (1990) of 563,000. The Division of Mental Health (DMH), an
arm of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, has the responsi-
bility for assuring the provision of mental health services to both children and adults.
The general service delivery system in Vermont consists of ten private, nonprofit
community mental health centers, which are the designated providers of mental
health services in the state; there is one CMHC in each of Vermont's ten catchment
areas. The Division of Mental Health has contracts with these providers, but the
contracts are not bid; instead, the CMHCs are annually re-funded. This service
delivery system is not used to provide services specifically geared to the homeless
mentally ill individual. It is, of course, true that all such individuals have access to
the services offered by the CMHCs, but Vermont has decided not to give primary
responsibility of reaching this population to the traditional service system.
This is similar to the situation in New Hampshire. The director of the Division of
Mental Health and Developmental Services in that state has the authority to desig-
nate providers as "approved" for funding; the same ten CMHCs have been the
approved providers since the 1970s. While in New Hampshire CMHCs are used
to perform outreach and case management services, a large part of the services
directed to the homeless mentally ill population is funded through contracts with
local community action programs. These programs either supply housing themselves
or monitor the availability of local housing. In addition, through a short-term cash
infusion program, the division supplies funding that allows these programs to offer
loans for initial rental costs like security deposits.
The Vermont Division of Mental Health estimates that there are approximately
1,200 homeless mentally ill individuals in the state. DMH funds all mental health
services to the homeless through the federal PATH program. Vermont received
$300,000 from the program in fiscal 1991. State matching funds came from a variety
of sources; for example, United Way, local municipal funds, state general funds, and
volunteers. Only one organization received matching funds from the Division of
Mental Health. 37
Due to the limited funds for services to the homeless, DMH has not attempted to
create a statewide program but has targeted funds to areas where there are existing
shelters or other homeless services programs. The policy is to tie the DMH program
for homeless mentally ill individuals onto services that already attract these individu-
als. It is believed to be unlikely that a person involved with a community mental
health center would become homeless, as services offered by all centers include
housing subsidies (to cover the waiting period for Section 8 funds) and advocacy in
addition to residential programs. Since people who are in the CMHC system are
quickly housed, the majority of homeless individuals are those who are not using the
CMHCs. In order to reach these individuals, the Division of Mental Health chose to
contract with generic, antipoverty organizations not automatically associated with
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mental health services. In the one case where services for the homeless are provided
through a community mental health center, the services are provided at a drop-in
center, not at the main office of the center.
The Division of Mental Health contracts with a variety of nonprofit organiza-
tions that provide services in six of the ten DMH catchment areas. The organiza-
tions include shelters, community action programs, a housing developer, and a
consortium organization in Burlington that consists of a health center, a temporary
shelter, and the community mental health center noted above. 38 The Division of
Mental Health does not fund stand-alone programs but adds to existing ones. The
type of organization that receives funding varies from location to location and
depends on both the need for services and the existing providers. For the most part,
DMH funds staff positions. For example, the division provides funds to shelters and
community action programs to permit the hiring of an outreach person whose func-
tion is to identify and make initial contact with individuals exhibiting symptoms of
mental illness. In Rutland, a neighborhood housing program, which provides assis-
tance in locating housing, receives funds to identify individuals who need mental
health services.
The services include outreach, case management, supportive counseling, assis-
tance in locating housing and accessing housing benefits, advocacy, and referral; the
emphasis is away from clinical treatment. The treatment philosophy is not necessar-
ily to bring people into the traditional CMHC system. The services offered depend
on the individual. If it makes sense to refer an individual to the standard system, this
occurs. However, these people often have "fired" the CMHC. The intent is to reach
the people who won't join the CMHC system.
The funding process begins when the DMH sends out notification of available
funding. All existing contractors and other organizations that have expressed an
interest in providing services geared toward individuals with mental illness are noti-
fied. In addition, there is an Advisory Board on Homelessness in Vermont whose
members include shelter operators, representatives from churches, the Alliance of
the Mentally 111, mental health services consumers, legal aid providers, and commu-
nity action program directors. This board is familiar with the organizations providing
services to homeless individuals and can identify potential contractors. For the most
part, however, the division has been working with the same core of providers since
1987, when the Mental Health Services to the Homeless block grant program began.
All organizations interested in receiving funding must submit an application and
make a presentation to the advisory board. Organizations must specify both the ser-
vices they propose and the budget necessary to provide them. The board annually
reviews all submissions, then makes recommendations for funding to DMH. Fund-
ing is not automatically renewed; an existing contractor must submit an annual
application and make a presentation regarding what has been accomplished in the
current year and what is proposed for the following year.
Specific unit prices for services are not exogenously set but rather contract
amounts are negotiated between the organization and the advisory board. The mem-
bers of this board are involved in the provision and use of services and are therefore
knowledgeable about the costs of services and the current pay scales. No outside
state agency determines the pricing of contracted services. This is in contrast to
Massachusetts, where two state agencies— the Rate Setting Commission and the
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Division of Purchased Services— both outside the state mental agency, have juris-
diction over pricing.
Contractors are required to submit quarterly reports regarding changes in clients
or services, staff training, coordination with other agencies serving the homeless
mentally ill population, expenses by budget line item, and client contact data. The
DMH program director reviews the quarterly reports and inquires about any
changes in client or service numbers in an attempt to solve any problems that arise
and as a way of monitoring changes in need which may necessitate changes in plans
for the coming year. In addition, a team from the advisory board visits the contrac-
tors' sites and reviews their quarterly reports.
From the above description, we may draw some preliminary comparisons between the
states' approaches to provider reimbursement and note possible policy implications.
First, states differ in their commitment to encouraging competition among bid-
ders. For example, although Rhode Island selected the provider of its drop-in center
by RFP, there are no plans to repeat the process in future years, effectively giving
the winner an indefinite contract. By contrast, the winner of an equivalent contract
in Massachusetts would be subject to a standard five-year RFP. This is in line with
each state's wider approach to mental health contracting, in which Massachusetts
appears to be more procompetitive.
However, it is also true that the use of RFPs can have anticompetitive effects in
that the time and effort needed to respond may become a barrier to entry by small
providers. In this respect, Massachusetts has higher barriers because it imposes
considerably more paperwork and other requirements on bidders. Kramer and
Grossman discuss this problem and note that states can reduce its impact by offering
technical assistance to bidders, which Massachusetts does, or by actively helping
recruit or establish new provider agencies. 39 Another argument sometimes made
against the RFP process is that there are few providers in small states and the gov-
ernment already knows their costs and utilization, so that the process does not offer
efficiency gains to offset the additional administrative costs.
A second observation is that the need to include nontraditional providers has a
different impact on states' contracting policies, depending on their approach to bid-
ding. Vermont and New Hampshire, which traditionally organize most of their con-
tracting around CMHCs, had to expand their approach to include nontraditional
providers. By contrast, Massachusetts was already committed to seeking multiple
bids and using non-CMHC providers, so presumably contracting with homeless shel-
ters would not have required major readjustments. However, this advantage appears
to have been pursued only slightly, since the majority of programs aimed at provid-
ing services to the homeless mentally ill population in Massachusetts are not con-
tracted but are operated by the department.
A third issue is the way the states deal with agencies that do not serve the home-
less mentally ill exclusively. Examples are how to structure financing the CMHCs so
that they treat some homeless and how to pay homeless shelters/agencies so that the
mentally ill benefit from the funding. Rhode Island addresses the first of these by
identifying, within the annual plan for service development, clients who are home-
less or at risk of homelessness as a high-priority group. Necessary services such as
housing, case management, and mobile treatment team are identified as well. With
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respect to structuring contracts with homeless shelters, both Massachusetts and
Vermont require that state funds be used to support staff with specific duties
and responsibilities.
One reason to study states' varying provider reimbursement arrangements would be
to see which approaches are best suited to helping as many homeless mentally ill as
possible, as cost-effectively as possible. This study is necessarily less ambitious, since
the health, housing, and cost outcomes associated with the different reimbursement
arrangements were not analyzed. Rather, one can only draw more limited conclu-
sions about how different contract designs are likely to affect the number of poten-
tial providers and the incentives facing them.
A conclusion is that existing contracting systems appear to reflect considerations
other than procompetitive ones, for example, the desire to ensure continuity of care.
This familiar problem in the human service sector confronts anyone attempting to
introduce contracting approaches developed for other sectors with different market
characteristics. Second, states appear to need contracting schemes flexible enough to
accommodate non-CMHC providers in the case of the homeless mentally ill, even if
their other mental health contracting is largely channeled through CMHCs. Finally,
coordination among state agencies is crucial, given the complementarities among ser-
vices needed by the homeless mentally ill; for example, funding special housing will
help only if the state also ensures that social support services will be funded.
A more general conclusion is that this is clearly an area in which further research
would be of benefit to policymakers. Like deinstitutionalization, contracting reform
may be an idea whose details of implementation matter a great deal, and ignoring
them could lead to undesired results. More work needs to be done to examine the
conditions under which the homeless mentally ill will be helped by contracting out,
and whether current and proposed reforms meet those conditions. The natural
diversity of states' existing approaches may provide valuable lessons for future
reform efforts.^
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